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SUMMARY
Multi-robot teams can complete complex missions that are not amenable to an individ-
ual robot. A team of heterogeneous robots with complementing capabilities is endowed
with advantages to allow deep collaboration in dynamic and complicated environments.
Multi-robot Task Allocation (MRTA) presents a fundamental for multi-robot system re-
search. Despite the previous research efforts, there remains a knowledge gap in developing
decentralized approaches for MRTA by viewing robots as resources and optimizing the
distribution of robots to achieve the best overall performance at the system level. To ad-
dress this knowledge gap, the objective of this research is to develop decentralized resource
allocation algorithms to provide approximate solutions for the MRTA problem.
Both standard congestion game theory and weighted congestion game theory are ex-
ploited as the theoretical framework to formulate and solve the MRTA problems. Two
types of resource allocation problems are considered, one has increasing marginal gain
with respect to the number of participating robots, the other has decreasing marginal gain
with respect to the number of participating robots. For MRTA problems with homoge-
neous robot teams, the sequential best response dynamics is integrated in the framework
of standard congestion game theory. A concurrent version of best response dynamics with
convergence guarantees is developed. In addition, a decentralized dual greedy algorithm is
proposed and its convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium is proved. For MRTA problems
with heterogeneous robot teams, the best sequential dynamics is shown to converge to pure
Nash equilibrium in the framework of weighted congestion games. The suboptimality of
the approximate solutions is discussed by λ − µ smoothness technique. Simulations and





1.1 Multi-Robot Task Allocation
Remarkable progress has been made in many areas of robotics-from microrobots for medicines
to large robotic arms in building constructions, and from space robots for outer space explo-
rations to underwater robots designed for deep-sea explorations [1]. Robotics are expected
to transform people’s daily life profoundly. For example, robots help people to combat
the pandemic of 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) by delivering food and contaminated
waste, and taking care of patients (e.g., telemedicine and monitoring the health status) [2].
Multi-robot system (swarm robotics) research is a subarea of robotics research, which is
recognized as one of the ten grand challenges for robotics [1]. Multi-robot teams will work
with people to enrich the quality of life and transform future work, such as environment
monitoring [3], and search and rescue [4]. Since tasks become more complicated and
require different capabilities, a homogeneous robot team with a single type of robot may be
insufficient to complete the task. Hence, it is imperative to develop robot teams composed
of heterogeneous robots. For example, teams of robots with different sensing abilities
could be distributed across a lake to monitor water quality [3]; groups of ground vehicles
and quadrotors could be employed to perform collaborative mapping for an earthquake-
damaged building [4].
MRTA is a fundamental problem in the field of multi-robot systems research. Since
robot teams need to allocate tasks to team members before performing the task, it is inap-
propriate to rely solely on human operators to assign different tasks to robots due to the
increasing number of robots in robot teams as well as the growing complexity of robot
tasks. Previous work has focused on designing both centralized and decentralized MRTA
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algorithms. When MRTA problems involve optimizing the sum of robots’ utilities (when
a robot’s utility is fixed for a specific task) or the sum of robots’ total traveling distance,
there exist decentralized approaches providing approximate solutions [5]. However, there
is a gap between centralized and decentralized approaches when the optimization problem
being solved is a resource allocation problem. Resource allocation problems view robots as
resources and strive to distribute robots to different tasks such that the overall performances
are optimized. The objective of this thesis is to develop decentralized MRTA algorithms to
provide approximate solutions to resource allocation problems for both homogeneous and
heterogeneous robot teams. This is achieved by using congestion game theory.
1.2 Congestion Games
Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal [6]. By now, congestion game theory
is a well-known framework to study scenarios in which selfish agents strive to allocate
resources. The following example is a typical problem addressed using the congestion
game theory. Suppose we have a finite set of agents and a finite set of roads. Each agent
has a starting point and a destination. Each agent strives to choose a set of roads such
that the agent’s total latency (travelling time) is minimized. The latency of each road is a
function of the congestion of that road (number of agents choosing that road). Standard
congestion game theory assumes each agent has the same effect on a road’s congestion
while weighted congestion game theory assumes agents have different effects on a road’s
(resource’s) congestion.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we investigate MRTA problems for both homogeneous and heterogeneous
robot teams. For both cases, we consider two types of resource allocation problems, with
increasing marginal gain or decreasing marginal gain. We discuss the suboptimality of the
approximate solutions and conduct simulations and experiments on Robotarium [7].
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For MRTA problems for homogeneous robot teams, our contributions lie in the follow-
ing aspects. (1) We introduce standard congestion games to design decentralized MRTA
algorithms to give approximate solutions to resource allocation problems. (2) We unify
the decentralized best response dynamics proposed in [8] under the framework of standard
congestion games, and we show that the assumption of robots’ monotonically decreasing
payoff functions is not necessary. (3) We present a concurrent version of best response
dynamics. Based on the technique developed in [9], we specifically tailor the parameters
and show convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. (4) We present a decentralized dual
greedy algorithm and show its convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. (5) We discuss the
suboptimality lower bound of a pure Nash equilibrium using λ− µ smoothness techniques
[10]. (6) Simulations are conducted to verify the scalability of the above algorithms. We
test suboptimality of a pure Nash equilibrium in simulations. (7) We implement the above
algorithms using real robots in the Robotarium [7].
For MRTA problems for heterogeneous robot teams, our contributions come from the
following aspects. (1) We introduce weighted congestion games to design decentralized
MRTA algorithms to provide approximate solutions to resource allocation problems. (2)
We prove the decentralized best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.
(3) We discuss the suboptimality lower bound of a pure Nash equilibrium using λ − µ
smoothness techniques [10]. (4) Simulations are conducted to verify the scalability and the
suboptimality of a pure Nash equilibrium. (5) We implement decentralized best response
dynamics for weighted congestion games using real robots in the Robotarium [7].
1.4 Thesis Overview
The remainder of the thesis is outlined as follows. In chapter 2, relevant studies on MRTA
and congestion games are reviewed. In chapter 3, the standard congestion game theory
is exploited to provide approximate solutions to the resource allocation problems for ho-
mogeneous robot teams. In chapter 4, the weighted congestion game theory is explored
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to solve the resource allocation among the heterogeneous robot teams. In chapter 5, the




2.1 Multi-Robot Task Allocation
The task allocation problem is fundamental in the field of multi-robot systems research
since robot teams need to allocate tasks to team members before performing the tasks.
Gerkey and Matarić [11] categorize task allocation problems according to the characteris-
tics of robots and tasks. Robots are single-task (ST) robots if they can only execute a single
task at a time or multi-task (MT) robots if they can perform multiple tasks concurrently.
Multi-robot (MR) tasks require more than one robot to complete while single-robot (SR)
tasks require only one robot. Task allocation problems can also be categorized according
to the planning horizon: instantaneous assignment (IA) or time-extended assignment (TA).
IA means robot teams only need to allocate tasks once based on current information. TA
indicates that robot teams need to allocate tasks dynamically based on new information.
We limit the scope to IA type problems in this thesis.
Centralized approaches for solving task allocation problems exist in the literature. ST-
SR problems are the simplest among all four categories, and these can be solved in poly-
nomial time [12]. The goal is to find a one-to-one matching between robots and tasks such
that the sum of utilities of all robots is maximized. ST-SR problems can be formulated
as finding a perfect weighted matching on a bipartite graph, and hence can be solved by
Hungarian methods [13]. The ST-MR problem, known as the coalition formation problem
in the operations research community, can be modeled as a set partitioning problem [11].
In the context of multi-robot research, set partition problems, which are NP-hard, aim to al-
locate robots to disjoint coalitions in order to maximize overall utility. Exact solutions and
heuristics for set partitioning problems are well studied [14, 15]. Readers are referred to
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Rasmussen [16] for a comprehensive review of exact and heuristic solutions. For the MT-
SR problem, Gerkey and Matarić have shown it is mathematically equivalent to the ST-MR
problem [11]. MT-MR problems can be formulated as set covering problems, which are
also well studied [17, 18, 19]. Set covering problems aim to assign robots to (possibly
overlapping) coalitions such that the sum of overall utilities is maximized. Readers are
referred to Caprara [20] for a survey of both exact and heuristic solutions.
All types mentioned above of task allocation problems can be formulated as optimiza-
tion problems for which the objective function is the sum of robots’ utilities. The unique
advantage of centralized approaches is that they provide good solution quality (if not op-
timal) for the optimization problem. However, centralized approaches rely on a central
agent. Hence, centralized approaches are not robust to the failure of the central agent and
suffer from scalability issues [5].
Numerous efforts have been made towards decentralizing robot task allocation algo-
rithms. Among all these efforts, market-based or auction methods, which typically have
both centralized and decentralized components, are the most popular. Many real-world
multi-robot task allocation systems are based on market-based approaches (Traderbots [21],
Murdoch [22], Alliance [23]). Market-based approaches involve auction processes, dur-
ing which robots bid for tasks based on their utilities for different tasks. For the ST-SR
problem, market-based approaches can be completely decentralized by using consensus
algorithms[24, 25, 26] with a lower bound on solution quality [27]. Luo and Sycara [28]
propose a decentralized auction algorithm with a lower bound on solution quality when
dependent tasks form groups. For the MT-SR problem, Lin and Zheng [29] develop a com-
binatorial bid mechanism. A manager robot of a task is responsible for selecting a subset of
bidding robots based on the combination of their bids, optimally, according to different cri-
teria. For the MT-MR problem, Vig and Adams [30] adapt multi-agent coalition formation
algorithms [31], which are not market-based approaches, to the field of multi-robot task
allocation. The coalition formation algorithm has two stages. Robots distributedly evaluate
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and select a task and coalition pair in the first stage while achieving consensus on forming
coalitions in the second stage. The algorithm addresses real robotics issues like failures of
robots and communication loss between robots.
When multi-robot task allocation problems involve optimizing the sum of robots’ util-
ities (when a robot’s utility is fixed for a specific task) or the sum of robots’ total traveling
distance, there exist decentralized approaches providing approximate solutions [5]. How-
ever, there is a gap between centralized and decentralized approaches when the optimiza-
tion problem being solved is a resource allocation problem. Resource allocation problems
have many applications in fields of communication [32, 33], computational grids [34, 35]
and cloud computing [36, 37]. One of the most popular resource optimization models is
the multiple knapsack problem [38]. In the field of communication, radio access allocation
problems are studied to minimize interference. In the field of computational grids or cloud
computing, resource allocation problems are useful to make the full use of computational
resources. In the context of multi-robot task allocation, resource allocation problems view
robots as resources and allocate them to different tasks such that the overall performance is
optimized. In [39], the ST-MR problem is considered as a resource allocation problem and
solved by a centralized task coordinator.
One way to develop decentralized approaches is to let robots’ utilities become func-
tions of resources (number of robots) allocated to a task. Hence, the congestion game
theory serves as a suitable tool since robots’ utilities are functions of the number of robots
participating in a task. In [8], hedonic game theory is used to solve ST-MR problems, al-
though the authors of [8] do not apply their work to solve resource allocation problems.
Hedonic games are the same as congestion games in the context of ST-MR problems, since
robots have singleton strategy spaces. Weighted congestion game theory is a perfect tool
to design decentralized approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems involv-
ing heterogeneous robot teams, as different robots are associated with different weights
according to their impacts on different tasks. [40].
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2.2 Congestion Games
First introduced by Rosenthal [6], congestion game theory captures resource sharing sce-
narios in which selfish players choose a subset of resources to maximize (minimize) their
payoff (delay). A player’s payoff for a resource is a function of the weights (load) using
that resource. In this thesis, we consider two types of congestion games, namely standard
congestion games and weighted congestion games. Standard congestion games associate
the same weight to all agents, while weighted congestion games associate different weights
to different agents.
Standard congestion games are potential games [40]. A potential game has a potential
function, which could express the incentives of players to change their strategies. An ad-
vantage of the potential game is the existence of pure Nash equilibrium, which is proven
by constructing a potential function [41]. If a potential function could be constructed for a
game, then players’ selfish behaviors, which increase their payoffs, would also strictly in-
crease the potential function. Hence, for finite congestion games, a pure Nash equilibrium
always exists. Sequential best response dynamics, during which players behave greedily,
are guaranteed to reach pure Nash equilibria in congestion games thanks to potential func-
tions.
In addition to sequential dynamics, concurrent dynamics have also proposed for con-
gestion games [9]. Weighted congestion game theory is a generalization of the congestion
game theory, as different players have different weights for different resources [42]. Unfor-
tunately, weighted congestion games are not potential games in general [43]. Nevertheless,
singleton weighted congestion games, in which players are only allowed to select only one
resource, convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed if the payoff is monoton-
ically decreasing or increasing with respect to the number of players in maximization or
minimization games [43].
The price of anarchy (POA), which is an important concept for game theory, gives
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a lower bound for the worst-case pure Nash equilibrium in terms of the sum of players’
payoffs to the optimal value of the sum of players’ payoffs [44]. Much work has been
done to discuss the POA for congestion games [45, 44, 46]. Among all these works, λ− µ
smoothness arguments provide a unified framework to derive the POA for different utility
functions [45]. The StrongNashequilibrium is another solution concept in game theory,
which allows players to form groups and take coordinated actions [47]. The set of strong
Nash equilibrium is a subset of the set of pure Nash equilibrium since every strong Nash
equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium but not vice versa. Since the set of strong Nash
equilibrium is a subset of the pure Nash equilibrium, it is possible to obtain better POA
bounds for some utility functions in congestion games [48, 49].
Congestion games have many applications in the field of communications, autonomous
driving, and power grids [50, 51]. In the field of communications, congestion game theory
is used to select distributed broadband network to minimize radio access interference [50].
In autonomous driving, altruistic autonomous cars can be designed to sacrifice their own
interests and to influence human drivers to lead to better POA bounds under the framework
of congestion game theory and finally decrease traffic congestion [51].
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CHAPTER 3
STANDARD CONGESTION GAME-BASED TASK ALLOCATION FOR
HOMOGENEOUS ROBOT TEAMS
In this chapter, we illustrate how to utilize standard congestion game theory to solve task
allocation problems for homogeneous robot teams. We model the task allocation problem
for homogeneous robot teams as two different types of resource allocation problems. We
explain the decentralized sequential best response dynamics algorithm developed in [8] and
prove the convergence to a pure Nash Equilibrium under the framework of standard conges-
tion game theory. By using standard congestion game theory, we show that the assumption
of robots’ monotonically decreasing utility function in [8] is not necessary. A decentralized
concurrent best response dynamics algorithm is developed. We also present a decentralized
dual greedy algorithm and show its convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. Lower bounds
of suboptimality for pure Nash equilibria with respect to the resource allocation problems
are discussed. Numerical simulations and experiments using real robots in the Robotarium
[7] are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the above algorithms.
3.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we give the definitions of the standard congestion game, pure Nash equi-
librium, strong Nash equilibrium, and potential function in the context of the ST-MR task
allocation problem.
Definition 1. A standard congestion game model is a tuple (N, T, (Σi)i∈N , (lj)j∈T , (Pi)i∈N),
where (1) N = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of n robots; (2) T = {1, 2, ..., t} is the set of t
different tasks; (3) Σi ⊆ T is the strategy space for robot i, which contains all tasks robot
i could choose; (4) lj is the latency function for task j, and the latency of a task measures
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the congestion of that task, which depends on how many robots are assigned to that task;
(5) Pi is the payoff function for robot i.
Denote S = Σ1 × Σ2... × ΣN . A strategy profile of the standard congestion game is
a vector s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S, where robot i ∈ N chooses a task si ∈ Σi. The latency
function lj(s) for task j is a function mapping from S to R. Given a strategy profile s, let
nj denote the number of robots assigned to task j. The latency function lj(s) for task j only
depends on nj such that lj(s) = lj(nj).
Given a strategy profile s, Robot i’s payoff function Pi(s) is equal to task si’s latency
function such that Pi(s) = lsi(s) = lsi(nsi), where si is the task robot i is assigned to in
strategy profile s. Let J(s) =
∑
i∈N











We consider payoff maximization games, in which robots strive to maximize their own
payoff.
Definition 2. A strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium if no robot could increase its






= (s1, ..., s
′
i, si+1, ..., sn), holds for ∀i ∈ N and ∀s
′
i ∈ Σi.
Definition 3. A strategy profile s is a strong Nash equilibrium if no coalitions of robots
(robots form groups to choose tasks in a coordinated way) could change their tasks in a
way such that every robot of the coalition could increase its payoff, i.e., for any strategy
profile s
′ 6= s, there at least exists a robot j such that sj 6= sp and Pj(s) ≥ Pj(s
′
).
Definition 4. An exact potential function is a function Φ mapping from S to R, such that
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for ∀i ∈ N and ∀s = (s1, ..., si, ..., sn), s
′
= (s1, ..., s
′
i, si+1, ..., sn) ∈ S,
Φ(s)− Φ(s′) = Pi(s)− Pi(s
′
).
Put it in another way, if a robot unilaterally changes its task, the change of the exact
potential function is equal to the change of the robot’s payoff.
Definition 5. A congestion game is an exact potential game if there exists an exact potential
function.
Assumption 1. We assume the communication network for robots is fully connected, i.e.,
there is a communication link between each pair of robots.
3.2 Two Resource Allocation Problems For Task Allocation For Homogeneous Robot
Teams
Definition 6. Suppose we have a task and its performance metric. The marginal gain of a
task is defined as the improvement of the task’s performance by adding one new participat-
ing robot to that task.
In this section, we formulate the task allocation problem for homogeneous robot teams
as two resource allocation problems. The first resource allocation problem assumes the
better performance of the task with more participating robots. However, the correspond-
ing marginal gain with respect to the number of participating robots is monotonically de-
creasing. There exist real-world robot tasks that align with this assumption. Consider
a team of robots tracking a moving target and collaboratively construct an observability
matrix. The trace of the observability matrix is a measure of the tracking performance,
which is a submodular function [52]. A submodular function is a set function. Suppose we
have a set X and set Y such that Y ⊂ X . A submodular function f has the property that
f(z ∪X) − f(X) < f(z ∪ Y ) − f(Y ) for any z in the domain of f. Hence, the marginal
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gain is monotonically decreasing. For exploration tasks that aim to maximize mutual infor-
mation of sensor measurements, mutual information is a submodular function [53]. Again,
the marginal gain for exploration tasks is monotonically decreasing.
The second resource allocation problem assumes the better performance of the task
with more participating robots, and the corresponding marginal gain regarding the num-
ber of participating robots is monotonically increasing. This assumption could be true in
real-world robotics applications when the number of participating robots is not very large.
For example, when robots teaming for information gathering or transporting an object,
the marginal gain of the performance of the task could be monotonically increasing with
respect to the number of participating robots.
These two types of resource allocation problem are simplifications of real-world robotic
applications, and we aim to use them to illustrate how to design decentralized algorithms
via congestion game theory to give approximate solutions to resource allocation problems.
More complicated real-world resource allocation problems could also be solved using con-
gestion game theory, thanks to its hierarchical structure (see figure 3.1). For a given re-
source allocation problem, a global objective function needs to be optimized. We could
decompose the global objective function such that the sum of all robots’ payoff functions
is the global function. Robots would selfishly optimize their payoff functions and reach a
pure Nash equilibrium via congestion game. In return, the pure Nash equilibrium provides
Resource allocation 
problem
Robots’payoff functions Pure Nash equlibirum
Congestion Game
Figure 3.1: Utilizing the hierarchical structure of congestion game
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an approximate solution to the resource allocation problem.
3.2.1 Marginal Gain Decreasing With Respect To the Number of Participating Robots
For the first type of resource allocation problem, with marginal gain monotonically de-
creasing with respect to the number of participating robots (see figure 3.2), the optimization





aj log(1 + nj) (3.1)
where n1, n2, ..., nt is the number of robots participating in task 1, 2, ..., t,
t∑
j=1
nj = n, n is
the total number of robots, and aj ∈ [0, 1] is the associated weight (priority) of task j.
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Figure 3.2: (a) global payoff of a task, i.e, the sum of all participating robots’ payoff ;(b)
robot’s payoff function
Given a strategy profile s, the corresponding robot level payoff function for robot i is:




if nsi > 0
0 if nsi = 0
(3.2)
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where si is the task robot i chooses in the strategy profile s, lsi is the latency function of task
si and nsi is the number of robots participating in task si. The robot level payoff function
Pi(s) is monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of co-working robots robots
assigned to task si. By summing over all robots’ payoff functions, optimizing the sum of
robots’ payoff become equivalent to optimizing the resource allocation problem in equation










aj log(1 + nj)
3.2.2 Marginal Gain Increasing With Respect to the Number of Participating Robots
For the second type of resource allocation problem, with marginal gain monotonically de-
creasing with respect to the number of participating robots (see figure 3.3), the optimization








s.t. nj ≤ cj, j = {1, 2, ..., t}
(3.3)




n is the total number of robots, aj is the associated weight (priority) of task j, cj is the
maximum number of participating robots for task j and
t∑
j=1
cj ≥ n. There are two reasons
for having a constraint on the maximum number of participating robots for a task: (1) If
there are no constraints, all robots would simply choose the task with the largest value for
aj , leaving rest of the tasks unassigned; (2) There could be physical limitations which lead
to a constraint on the maximum number of participating robots for the individual tasks.
Remark 1. This is a simple optimization problem. However, its counterpart (see section
4.2.1) in weighted congestion games is equivalent to the multiple quadratic knapsack prob-
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lem, which is NP-hard [38].
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Figure 3.3: (a) global payoff of a task, i.e, the sum of all participating robots’ payoff ;(b)
robot’s payoff function when the number of co-working robots satisfies the constraint.
Given a strategy profile s, the corresponding robot level payoff function for robot i is:
Pi(s) = lsi(s) = lsi(nsi) =

asinsi if nsi ≤ csi
0 if nsi > csi
(3.4)
where si is the task robot i chooses in the strategy profile s, lsi is the latency function of task
si and nsi is the number of robots participating in task si. The robot level payoff function
Pi(s) is monotonically increasing with respect to the number of co-working robots when
the number of co-working robots is no more than csi . If the number of co-working robots
is greater than csi , robot i’s payoff becomes zero. This ensures the numbers of participat-
ing robots for all tasks satisfy the constraints in any resultant pure Nash equilibrium. By
summing over all robots’ payoff functions, optimizing the sum of robots’ payoff becomes
equivalent to optimizing the the resource allocation problem defined by (3.3). To be more
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3.3 Decentralized Sequential Best Response Dynamic
In this section, we unify the decentralized sequential best response dynamics developed in
[8] under the framework of congestion game theory. By using congestion game theory, we
show that the monotonically decreasing assumption of robots’ payoff functions in [25] is
unnecessary for convergence. Hence, decentralized sequential best response dynamic work
for both resource allocation problems in section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2. We also provide
time complexity analysis from the perspective of congestion game theory.
3.3.1 Algorithm Description
Robot i has four variables, namely satisfied, roundi, randnumi and Πi. If satisfied is true,
robot i’s current task maximizes its payoff . Hence, robot i has no incentive for choosing a
new task. If satisfied is false, robot i could choose the task to achieve the maximum payoff.
Πi(m) is robot i’s data for which task robot m is choosing. Πi is the set of Πi(m),∀m ∈ N ,
which contains data about all robots’ current chosen tasks. roundi indicates how many
rounds Πi has evolved. Each time Πi is updated, roundi is incremented by one. randnumi
is a random number, which is assigned a random value whenever Πi is updated. M i is the
collection of robot i’s three variables, Πi, roundi and si.
For the initialization phase (lines 1-8), robot i randomly chooses a task (line 3). Robot
i’s Πi(i) is updated accordingly (line 4). Then robot i broadcasts its own M i and receives
Mk, ∀k 6= i ∈ N , from other robots (line 5). Robot i updates Πi based on data received
subsequently (line 6-8).
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Algorithm 1: Decentralized sequential best response dynamics for each robot i ∈
N
/* Initialization */
1 satisfied←false; roundi ← 1; randnumi ← 0;
2 Πi = {Πi(m)← 0,∀m ∈ N};
3 Randomly choose a task j ∈ T;
4 Update Πi(i)← j ;
5 Broadcast M i = {Πi, roundi, randnumi} and receive
Mk = {Πk, roundk, randnumk},∀k 6= i ∈ N ;
6 for every k 6= i ∈ N do
7 Πi(k)← Πk(k);
8 end
/* Main loop for sequential best response dynamics */
9 while true do
10 if satisfied == false then
11 choose task j∗ which maximizes robot i’s payoff;
12 if j∗ 6= Πi(i) then
13 roundi ← roundi + 1;





19 Broadcast M i = {Πi, roundi, randnumi} and receive
Mk = {Πk, roundk, randnumk},∀k 6= i ∈ N ;
20 construct the set K? ← {k 6= i ∈ N | arg max
k
roundk};
21 k?? ← arg max
k∈K?
randnumk;









After initialization, robot i starts to execute the main loop of sequential best response
dynamics (lines 9-26). If robot i’s satisfied equals false, then robot i would choose a task
j∗ which maximizes its payoff (lines 10-11). If task j∗ is not the same as Πi(i), then
Πi(i), roundi and randnumi are updated accordingly (lines 12-16). Robot i’s satisfied is
set to true (line 17). Next, robot i broadcasts its own M i and receives Mk,∀k 6= i ∈ N ,
from other robots (lines 19). Based on the data received, robot i first constructs setK?, such
that each robot k ∈ K? ’s roundk is the largest in the set N (line 20). Then robot i finds
robot k??, whose randnumk?? is the largest in the set K? (line 21). If i is not equal to k??,
robot i’s Πi, roundi, randnumi and satisfied are assigned the values of Πk?? , roundk?? ,
randnumk
?? and false (lines 22-25). Afterward, robot i proceeds to execute the above
while loop again.
It is important to note that lines 19-25 ensure only one robot could select a new task
during each iteration of the while loop. Also, robots behave greedily to choose tasks that
maximize their own payoffs. Hence, this algorithm is called decentralized sequential best
response dynamic.
3.3.2 Convergence to a Pure Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 1. Decentralized sequential best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium.








where np is the number of robots choose task p in strategy profile s. To be more specific,
when robot i switches from si = p to s
′
i = q, the change of the exact potential function is:
Φ(s)− Φ(s′) = lp(np)− lq(nq + 1) (3.6)
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where s′ = (s1, ..., s
′
i = q, si+1, ..., sn), nq is the number of robots that choose task q in
strategy profile s. By definition, the above change is equivalent to the change of robot i’s
payoff:
lp(np)− lq(nq + 1) = lp(s)− lq(s′) = Pi(s)− Pi(s
′
) (3.7)
During each iteration of sequential best response dynamics, a robot behaves greedily to
maximize its payoff. Every time a robot switches to a new task, the change of its payoff
function is strictly positive. Hence, the exact potential function is strictly increasing during
the process of sequential best response dynamics. Because we consider a finite number
of robots and tasks, sequential best response dynamics would converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium, in which no robot could unilaterally increase its payoff.
Since the exact potential function for standard congestion games has no assumptions of
robots’ payoff functions or tasks’ latency functions, there is no need to assume monotoni-
cally decreasing payoff functions.
3.3.3 Time Complexity Analysis
We refer to the unit of time required for each robot to execute an iteration of the sequential
best response dynamics (lines 10-25) as a time step. A robot would execute at most nt2
iterations of the sequential best response dynamics before converging to a pure Nash equi-
librium [54], since the potential function has at most nt2 distinct values. A robot needs to
investigate t tasks in an iteration (line 11). The complexity for constructing the set K? and
finding k?? is O(n) (lines 20-21). Hence, the time complexity is O(n2t3).
3.4 Decentralized Concurrent Best Response Dynamics
In this section, we present a concurrent version of best response dynamics. Based on the
technique developed in [9], we specifically tailor the parameters for the resource allocation
problem in section 3.2.1 and show convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. Concurrent
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dynamics allow all robots to make a decision per iteration, while only a single robot could
make a decision per iteration in sequential dynamics. Hence, concurrent best response
dynamics require less coordination among robots than sequential best response dynamics.
In previous sections, we consider payoff maximization games. For the convenience of
proof, in this section we consider the equivalent payoff minimization games by taking the
opposite of robots’ payoff functions in maximization games.
3.4.1 Algorithm Description
Algorithm 2: Decentralized concurrent best response dynamics for each robot
i ∈ N
/* Initialization */
1 Πi = {Πi(m)← 0,∀m ∈ N};
2 Randomly chooses a task j ∈ T;
3 Πi(i)← j;
4 Broadcast Πi and receive Πk,∀k 6= i ∈ N ;
5 for every k 6= i ∈ N do
6 Πi(k)← Πk(k);
7 end
/* Main loop for concurrent best response dynamics */
8 while true do
9 j∗← concurrent protocol(Πi);
10 if j∗ 6= Πi(i) then
11 Πi(i)← j∗;
12 end
13 Broadcast Πi and receive Πk,∀k 6= i ∈ N ;




Robot i has one variable Πi. Πi(m) is robot i’s data for which task robot m is choosing.
Πi is the set of Πi(m),∀m ∈ N , which contains robot i’s data about all robots’ current
chosen tasks.
For the initialization phase (lines 1-7), robot i randomly chooses a task (line 2). Robot
i’s Πi(i) is updated accordingly (line 3). Then robot i broadcasts its own Πi and receives
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Algorithm 3: Concurrent protocol for robot i ∈ N
1 Function concurrent protocol (Πi)




3 Let robot i sample a task j ∈ T uniformly at random;
4 if lΠi(i)(nΠi(i)) > lj(nj + 1) then
5 p← j with migration probability
min{1, 0.25tlmax
n





Πk,∀k 6= i ∈ N , from other robots (line 4). Robot i updates Πi based on data received
subsequently (line 5-7).
For the main loop of concurrent best response dynamics (lines 8-17), robot i first ex-
ecutes concurrent protocol (line 9). During the concurrent protocol (algorithm 3), robot i
samples a task j uniformly at random (line 3 in algorithm 3). Next, nj and nΠi(i) are the
numbers of robots doing task j and task Πi(i), which could be obtained via Πi. If lj(nj+1)
is smaller than lΠi(i)(nΠi(i)), then p would be assigned the value of j with the probability
specified in line 5 of algorithm 3, where lmax = max
j∈T
lj(n). Afterward, the concurrent
protocol is completed and j? is assigned the value of p (line 9 in algorithm 2).
Next, if Πi(i) is not equal to j?, Πi(i) is assigned the value of j? (lines 10-12). Robot
i broadcasts Πi and receives Πk from other robots (line 13). Πi is updated according to
the data received (line 14-16). Afterward, robot i proceeds to execute the above while loop
again.
Remark 2. (Explanation of the probability in algorithm 3): In algorithm 3, p is assigned




}, where t is the num-
ber of tasks, lmax = max
j∈T
lj(n), n is the number of robots, nj and nΠi(i) are the numbers of
robots doing task j and task Πi(i), lΠi(i) is the latency function of task Πi(i) and lj is the
latency function of task j. This probability ensures decentralized concurrent best response
22
dynamics would converge to a pure Nash equilibrium (see the proof of theorem 2).
3.4.2 Convergence to a Pure Nash Equilibrium
Assumption 2. For payoff maximization (minimization) games, Decentralized concurrent
best response dynamics assume a task’s latency function is monotonically decreasing (in-
creasing) with respect to the number of participating robots.
This assumption ensures that concurrent best response dynamics converge to a pure
Nash equilibrium. Given a strategy profile, a robot’s payoff is equivalent to the latency of
this robot’s assigned task. Hence, this assumption implies that concurrent best response
dynamics are only applicable to resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal
gains as discussed in section 3.2.1 but not for the resource allocation problem discussed in
section 3.2.2. For resource allocation problems discussed in section 3.2.2, sequential best
response dynamics remains applicable.
Theorem 2. For resource allocation problems formulated in section 3.2.1, decentralized
concurrent best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.








where nj is the number of robots choose task j in strategy profile s.
Given a strategy profile s, let s′ denote the strategy profile after one round of concurrent
dynamics (lines 9-16 in algorithm 2). Let the difference of Φ(s′) and Φ(s) be:
∆Φ(s
′
, s) = Φ(s
′
)− Φ(s) (3.9)
Define xjp as the number of robots switching from task j to task p in one round of
concurrent dynamics. In one round of concurrent dynamics, each robot makes a decision as
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each of them was the only agent to make a decision. Hence, for robots switching from task
j to task p, their payoffs in strategy profile s before their moves are Pi(s) = lj(s) = lj(nj),
where nj is the number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s. These robots believe
their payoffs are lp(np+1) as each of them was the only agent to make a decision, where np
is the number of robots doing task p in s. The payoff is lp(np + 1) since that robots believe
that all robots are not making a decision except for themselves. However this is not true, as
robots all make a decision in a round of concurrent dynamics. Since robots are minimizing
their payoffs, switching from task j to p implies that lp(np + 1) − lj(nj) < 0. Otherwise,
robots would not make a decision to switch from j to j‘.





) = xjp(lp(np + 1)− lj(nj)) (3.10)
where nj and np are the number of robots doing task j and p in s. Vjp(s, s
′
) is the sum
of the payoff changes each robots switching from task j to task p would contribute to the
change of the potential function Φ if each of them was the only migrating agent.
In order to compensate for the fact that each agent makes a decision concurrently, we
define the error term Fj(s, s
′







lj(u)− lj(nj + 1) if ∆xj > 0
nj∑
u=nj+∆xj+1
lj(nj)− lj(u) if ∆xj < 0





xj?j − xjj? is the difference between the number of robots doing task j
in profile s and s′ .
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) is strictly negative since we are considering payoff minimization games. Next
we need to show the sum of Fj(s, s
′
) and Fp(s, s
′
) is bounded by −0.5Vjp(s, s
′
).
Suppose a robot i switches from task j to p in a round of concurrent dynamics. Robot
i’s contribution to Vjp(s, s
′
) is lp(np + 1)− lj(nj). To bound its contribution to error terms
Fj(s, s
′
) and Fp(s, s
′
), we consider the set N ′ of robots switching to p.
Recall that in the concurrent protocol (algorithm 3), robot i move to task p with it’s




}, where t is the number of tasks,
lmax = max
j∈T
lj(n), n is the number of robots, nj and nΠi(i) are the numbers of robots doing
task j and task Πi(i), lΠi(i) is the latency function of task Πi(i) and lj is the latency function
of task j. We order set N ′ with robots’ ascending migration probabilities. Let X̂i denote
the random number of robots ranking before robot i inN ′ according to the above ascending
order. We upper bound robot i’s contribution to Fp(s, s
′
) as lp(np + X̂i)− lp(np + 1).
Thanks to the migration probability defined in algorithm 3, we have:






lj(nj)− lp(np + 1)
lj(nj)
≤ 0.25(lj(nj)− lp(np + 1))
(3.13)
Recall we are considering equivalent payoff minimization games by taking the opposite of
the payoff functions in section 3.2.1 (equation 3.2). The first inequality holds true as 1 is
greater than the maximum slope of the payoff function. For the second inequality, it is true
as there are at most n robots samples task p in a round of concurrent dynamics. The third
inequality holds true since lmax
lj
≤ 1, as lmax ≥ lj(nj) and lj, lmax are negative numbers
(because we taking the opposite of the payoff functions in section 3.2.1).
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We consider the set N ′′ of robots departing from task j. We let X̄i denote the ran-
dom number of robots ranking before robot i in N ′′ according to the ascending migration
probabilities. We associate robot i’s contribution to Fj(s, s
′
) as lj(nj) − lj(nj − X̄i + 1).
Similarly, we have:
E[lj(nj)− lj(nj − X̄i + 1)] ≤ 0.25(lj(nj)− lp(np + 1)) (3.14)
Combining inequalities (3.13) and (3.14), we have:
Fj(s, s
′
) + Fp(s, s
′
) ≤ 0.5(lj(nj)− lp(np + 1))
= −0.5(lp(np + 1)− lj(nj))
(3.15)
Thanks to inequality (3.15), we finally have:
E[∆Φ(s
′



















Hence, concurrent best response dynamics would converge to a pure Nash equilibrium
in expectation.
3.4.3 Time Complexity Analysis
We refer to the unit of time required for each robot to execute a round of the concurrent
best response dynamics (lines 9-16) as a time step. Let s denote the strategy profile after
initialization, lmax = max
j∈T




lj(nj) − lp(np + 1). Decen-





3.5 Decentralized dual greedy algorithm
In this section, we decentralize the dual greedy algorithm developed in [55] and show
its convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium. For the convenience of the proof, we con-
sider payoff equivalent payoff minimization games by taking the opposite of robots’ payoff
functions.
3.5.1 Algorithm Description
Each robot i has seven variables: U i, Πi, ci, nosoli, ji?, stop
i and randnumi. U i is the
set of {ui1, ui2, ..., uit}, where ui1, ui2, ..., uit indicates the constraint on maximum number
of participating robots for each task. Πi(m) is robot i’s data for which task robot m is
choosing. Πi is the set of Πi(m),∀m ∈ N . ci is a variable which indicates whether robot
i changes its strategy. nosoli is a variable which implies whether robot i could find a
feasible solution. stopi indicates whether robot i sticks to its strategy and would not make
any further changes. ji?is a variable which indicates the task has maximum latency (line
10). randnumi is a random number, which is used for consensus.
For the initialization phase (lines 1-7), robot i randomly chooses a task and updates
Πi (line 3). Then robot i broadcasts Πi and receives Πk from other robots (line 4). Πi is
updated according to the data received (lines 5-7).
For the main loop of the decentralized dual greedy algorithm (lines 9-30), robot i first
examines its variable stopi (line 9). If stopi equals to zero, ji? is set to be task j, which
maximizes lj(uij) (line 10). If stop
i equals to one, ji? is set to zero (line 12). Next, robot
i broadcasts ji? and receive j
k
? ,∀k 6= i ∈ N from other robots (line 14). ji? is updated
according to the data received (line 15). uiji? is decreased by one (line 16).
Afterward, robot i would execute dual greedy protocol (algorithm 5). If Πi 6= ji?, ci,
nosoli, and randnumi are set to zero (lines 2-3 in algorithm 5). Let npar(ji?) denotes the
number of robots doing task ji?. If Π
i equals to ji? and u
i
ji?
≥ npar(ji?), ci, nosoli, and
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Algorithm 4: Decentralized dual greedy algorithm for each robot i ∈ N
/* Initialization */
1 U i = {ui1 ← n, ui2 ← n, ..., uit ← n}, ci ← 0, nosoli ← 0, ji? ←
0, stopi ← 0, randnumi ← 0;
2 Πi = {Πi(m)← 0,∀m ∈ N};
3 Πi(i)← Randomly chooses a task j ∈ T;
4 Broadcast Πi and receive Πk,∀k 6= i ∈ N ;
5 for every k 6= i ∈ N do
6 Πi(k)← Πk(k);
7 end
/* Main loop for decentralized dual greedy algorithm */
8 while max U i > 0 do
9 if stopi == 0 then






12 ji? ← 0;
13 end
14 Broadcast ji? and receive j
k
? , ∀k 6= i ∈ N ;
15 ji? ← max
k∈N
jk? ;




17 ci, nosoli, randnumi, Πi ← Dual greedy protocol (Πi, ji?);
18 Broadcast M i = {ci, nosoli, randnumi,Πi} and receive Mk,∀k 6= i ∈ N ;
19 k? ← max
{k∈N |ck=1}
randnumk;
20 if nosolk? == 0 then
21 if ci == 1 then
22 Πi(i)← Πk?(k?), ci ← 0, nosoli ← 0, randnumi ← 0;
23 end
24 else
25 if ci == 1 then
26 stopi ← 1
27 else
28 uiji? ← 0, c





Algorithm 5: Dual greedy protocol for robot i ∈ N
1 Function Dual greedy protocol (Πi, ji?)
2 if Πi(i) 6= ji? then




?) is the number of robots doing task j
i
?
based on the data of Πi */
5 if uiji? ≥ npar(j
i
?) then
6 ci ← 0, nosoli ← 0, randnumi ← 0;
7 else
8 construct set F = {j ∈ T |uij > npar(j)i};
9 if F 6= ∅ then
10 Πi(i)← randomly chooses a task j from set F ,
ci ← 1, nosoli ← 0, randnumi ← unif [0, 1];
11 else




16 return ci, nosoli, randnumi, Πi ;




robot i constructs a set F which contains all tasks such that uij > npar(j)
i, e.g., the total
number of participating robots for the task is less than the constraint on the number of
maximim participating robots (line 8 in algorithm 5). If F is not an empty set, robot i
randomly chooses a task from the set F (line 10 in algorithm 6). Next, ci, nosoli are set to
{1, 0}. Also, randnumi is assigned a random value draws uniformly from [0, 1] (line 10 in
algorithm 5). If F is an empty set, ci, nosoli are set to {1, 1}. Also, randnumi is assigned
a random value draws uniformly from [0, 1] (line 12 in algorithm 5).
Robot i broadcasts M i = {ci, nosoli, si,Πi} and receives Mk from other robots sub-
sequently (line 18). k? is set to maximize sk, {k ∈ N |ck = 1} (line 19). If nosolk? equals to
zero and ci equals to 1, then Πi, ci, nosoli , randnumi are set the values of {Πk?(k?), 0, 0, 0}
(line 22). If nosolk? equals to 1 and ci equals to 1, then stopi is set to 1 (line 26). If nosolk?
equals to zero and ci equals to 0, then uiji? , c
i, nosoli , randnumi are set the values of
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{0, 0, 0, 0} (line 28).
3.5.2 Convergence to a Pure Nash Equilibrium
Assumption 3. For payoff maximization (minimization) games, Decentralized dual greedy
algorithm assumes a task’s latency function is monotonically decreasing (increasing) with
respect to the number of participating robots.
Similar to section 3.4.2, this assumption ensures that decentralized dual greedy algo-
rithm converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. In the context of the ST-MR task allocation problem, the set of strong Nash
equilibrium is equivalent to the set of pure Nash equilibrium for standard congestion games
with monotone latency functions [56].
Theorem 4. For resource allocation problems formulated in section 3.2.1, decentralized
dual greedy algorithm converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let N1, N2, ..., Nk denote k different groups of robots. Nk denotes the kth group of







nj , where nj is the number of robots doing task
j. The rest of the proof for converging to a strong Nash equilibrium is followed by [55]. By
theorem 3, decentralized dual greedy algorithm converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
3.5.3 Time Complexity Analysis
We refer to the unit of time required for each robot to execute an iteration of the decentral-
ized dual greedy algorithm (lines 9-30) as a time step. A robot would execute at most nt
iterations of the main loop of the dual greedy algorithm before converging to a pure Nash
equilibrium. In each iteration, a robot needs to investigate t different tasks (line 10). The
complexities of finding max
k∈N
jk? (line 15) and max
{k∈N |ck=1}
randnumk (line 19) are both O(n).
In each iteration, a robot executes dual greedy protocol once. In each dual greedy protocol,
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a robot needs to investigate t different tasks to construct the set F (line 8 in algorithm 3).
Hence, the time complexity is O(n2t2).
3.6 Suboptimality











?) is the maximum
value of the sum of all robots’ payoff, and s? is the corresponding optimal strategy profile.
In this section, we investigate the lower bound of suboptimality for any resultant pure
Nash equilibria.
3.6.1 Marginal Gain Increasing
We utilize the λ − µ smoothness technique developed in [10] to investigate lower bounds
of suboptimality for the resource allocation problem formulated in section 3.2.2.
Assumption 4. For a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile s, each task has at least one
participating robots.
This assumption is useful for further developments.
Suppose strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium, and s? is a strategy profile that
maximizes the sum of all robots’ payoff. By the definition of pure Nash equilibrium, we




where s = (s1, ..., si, ..., sn), s
′
= (s1, ..., s
?
i , ..., sn) and s
?
i is the task robot i chooses
in the optimal strategy profile s?. For now, we assume after robot i moves from si to
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s?i , the resultant strategy profile still satisfies the constraint (e.g, the number of a task’s
participating robots does not exceed the constraint on the maximum number of participating
robots).


















where nj is the number of robots doing task j in profile s and n?j is the number of robots
doing task j in strategy profile s?. The first inequality holds true due to the definition of
pure Nash equilibrium. There are two different cases for robots switching to task j. In
the first case, robot i already chooses task j in strategy profile s and its payoff is lj(nj) in
strategy profile s′ . In the second case, robot i chooses a task other than j in strategy profile
s. Its payoff is lj(nj + 1) in strategy profile s
′ . The second inequality holds true since
lj,∀j ∈ T is monotonically increasing for this type of resource allocation problem.
Suppose there exists λ > 0 and µ > 0 such that for arbitrary task j:
lj(nj)n
?
j ≥ λlj(n?j)n?j − µlj(nj)nj, nj = {1, . . . , cj − 1}, n?j = {1, . . . , cj} (3.19)
where cj is the constraint on the maximum number of participating robots of task j. The
reason for nj ranging from 1 to cj − 1 is that we assume after robot i moves from si to s?i ,






































?). The first inequality follows from (3.18).
The second inequality follows from (3.19). The third inequality follows from µ > 0.







In the derivation of inequality (3.17), we assume that after robot i moves from si to
s?i , the resultant strategy profile still satisfies the constraint (e.g, the number of a task’s
participating robots does not exceed the constraint on the maximum number of participat-
ing robots). However, it is possible that the resultant strategy profile does not satisfies the
constraints. As shown in equation (3.4), a robot’s payoff would become zero if the strat-
egy profile does not satisfies the constraints. To handle this case, we let λ and µ satisfy
additional constraints for arbitrary task j ∈ T :
lj(nj) ≥ λlj(n?j)n?j − µlj(nj)nj, nj = {1, . . . , cj}, n?j = {1, . . . , cj} (3.22)
where cj is the constraint on the maximum number of participating robots of task j.
Suppose there is a set N ′ of robots switching to task j in the strategy profile s′ , but the








≥ λlj(n?j)n?j − µlj(nj)nj
(3.23)
where si is the task robot i chooses in the strategy profile s and nsi is the number of robots
doing task si in the strategy profile s. The inequality holds true due to (3.22). We can plug
(3.23) into (3.20) such that (3.21) still holds true.
In summary, for this specific resource allocation problem, one way to find the lower






s.t. λq2 − µp2≤ pq, p = {1, . . . , (ck)max − 1}, q = {1, . . . , (ck)max}
λ(q
′
)2 − µ(p′)2≤ p′ , p′ = {1, . . . , (ck)max}, q
′
= {1, . . . , (ck)max}
.
where (ck)max is the maximum of ck,∀k ∈ T and cj is the constraint on the maximum
number of participating robots of task j.
Example 1. Suppose there are twenty robots and seven tasks and that the maximum number
for each task’s participating robot is 3, i.e. ci = 3, i = {1, ..., 7}. The corresponding
suboptimality lower bound is 0.1111.
Remark 3. Suboptimality lower bounds obtained by solving the nonlinear optimization
problem are conservative. In our experiments, we observe much better performances,
which are close to optimal.
3.6.2 Marginal Gain Decreasing
For this specific resource allocation problem formulated in section 3.2.1, robots’ payoff
functions are monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of co-working robots
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(see section 3.2.1). The suboptimality lower bound is at least 1
2




We conduct numerical simulations to investigate algorithms’ scalability regarding the num-
ber of tasks and robots. We define an iteration as an iteration of the main loop of the al-
gorithms (lines 10-24 for sequential best response dynamics, lines 9-16 for concurrent best
response dynamics, lines 9-30 for decentralized dual greedy algorithm). For each test case,
we run 100 Monte Carlo trials. The statistical results of iterations required for convergences
are shown in figures 3.4-3.7 as box plots. The mean values of iterations are indicated by a
green circle and connected via green lines.



















































Figure 3.4: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with decreas-
ing marginal gain. (a)iterations of convergence for varying numbers of tasks; (b)iterations
of convergence for varying numbers of robots
We test the scalability of sequential best response dynamics applying to both two
types of resource allocation problems. For resource allocation problems with decreasing
marginal gain, the convergence performance is shown in figure 3.4. To test the scala-
bility regarding the number of robots, we consider scenarios with fixed t = 5 and n ∈
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{50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}. Figure 3.4(a) shows the number of iterations for convergence
is approximately a linear function of the number of robots, which lines up with the analysis
in section 3.3.3. For scalability with respect to the number of tasks, we consider scenarios
with fixed n = 50 and t ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}. Figure 3.4(b) shows that the number of iterations
for convergence is also approximately a linear function of the number of tasks. However,
the analysis in section 3.3.3 states that iterations are quadratic in the number of tasks. The
reason is that analysis in section 3.3.3, which considers worst cases, is conservative. For
resource allocation problems with increasing marginal gain, the convergence performance
is shown in figure 3.5. To test the scalability regarding the number of robots, we consider
scenarios with fixed t = 5 and n ∈ {50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}. Figure 3.5(a) shows the
number of iterations for convergence is approximately a linear function of the number of
robots. For scalability with respect to the number of tasks, we consider scenarios with fixed
n = 300 and t ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}. Figure 3.5(b) shows that the number of iterations is linear
with the number of tasks.






















































Figure 3.5: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with increas-
ing marginal gain and constraints on maximum participating robots: (a)iterations of con-
vergence for varying numbers of tasks; (b)iterations of convergence for varying numbers
of robots increase min
Test results for decentralized dual greedy algorithm are shown in figure 3.6. Given the
number of robots and tasks, we observe that the iterations required for convergence are
36
fixed in the experiments. Test results clearly indicate the number of iterations for conver-
gence is both linear in the number of tasks and robots. This aligns with the analysis in
section 3.5.3.




















































Figure 3.6: Convergence performance for decentralized dual greedy with decreasing
marginal gain. (a)iterations of convergence for varying numbers of tasks; (b)iterations
of convergence for varying numbers of robots

























































Figure 3.7: Convergence performance for concurrent best response dynamics with decreas-
ing marginal gain. (a)iterations of convergence for varying numbers of tasks; (b)iterations
of convergence for varying numbers of robots
Test results for concurrent best response dynamics are shown in figure 3.7. For scal-
ability with respect to the number of robots, we consider scenarios with fixed t = 5 and
n ∈ {10, 15, 20, 25}. For scalability regarding the number of tasks, we consider scenarios
with fixed n = 20 and t ∈ {5, 10, 15}.
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3.7.2 Suboptimality



















Figure 3.8: Suboptimality trials for resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal
gains
We apply sequential best response dynamics, concurrent best response dynamics, and
decentralized dual greedy algorithm to resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal
gains (section 3.2.1). We consider scenarios with 50 robots and 5 tasks. Task weights are
randomly generated. Figure 3.8 shows all algorithms achieve near-optimal performances.























Figure 3.9: Suboptmality lower bounds for resource allocation problems with increasing
marginal gains
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For resource allocation problems with increasing marginal gains, we apply decentral-
ized sequential best response dynamics to give approximate solutions. We consider 20
robots and 7 tasks. Each task could have a maximum of three participating robots. We run
100 Monte Carlo trials (see figure 3.9). The suboptimality lower bound computed by solv-
ing the nonlinear optimization problem discussed in section 3.6.2 is 0.1111. However, in
the experiment, we observe optimal performances. This validates the statement in remark
4- the suboptimality lower bound is conservative.
3.7.3 Comparison
Decentralized sequential best response dynamics could admit all classes of payoff func-
tions, while concurrent best response dynamics and dual greedy could only admit payoff
functions that are monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of participating
robots. Concurrent best response dynamics require less coordination than sequential best
response dynamics. However, concurrent best response dynamics needs much more itera-
tions to converge compared to sequential best response dynamics. Three algorithms have
not many differences in terms of suboptimality.
3.8 Experiments on Robotarium
In this section, we implement sequential best response, concurrent best response, and de-
centralized dual greedy algorithm on the multi-robot test bed Robotarium.
We consider 7 robots and 4 tasks. We divide the Robotarium into 4 subareas. Each sub-
area represents a task. If a robot is staying in a subarea, it is participating in the task which
this specific subarea represents. Figure 3.10 shows decision processes for three different
tasks. For resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal gains, we implement se-
quential best response dynamics, concurrent best response dynamics and decentralized dual
greedy to give approximate solutions. The task weights for 4 tasks are [0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.9].





Figure 3.10: (a) Decision process for sequential best response dynamics; (b) Decision




Table 3.1: Task allocation result for resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal
gains
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
Sequential best response dynamics 2 1 1 3
Concurrent best response dynamics 2 1 1 3
Decentralized dual greedy 2 1 1 3
For resource allocation with increasing marginal gains, we implement sequential best
response dynamics to give approximate solutions. Weights and maximum number of par-
ticipating robots are [0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.9] and [2, 2, 2, 2]. See table 3.2 for task allocation result.
Table 3.2: Task allocation result for resource allocation problems with increasing marginal
gains
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
Sequential best response dynamics 2 2 1 2




WEIGHTED CONGESTION GAME-BASED TASK ALLOCATION FOR
HETEROGENEOUS ROBOT TEAMS
In this chapter, we illustrate how to utilize weighted congestion game theory to solve task
allocation problems for heterogeneous robot teams. We model the system of heterogeneous
robots as a community of different species (different types) of robots. Thanks to weighted
congestion game theory, different species of robots have different weights for different
tasks to capture their different impacts on different tasks. We model the task allocation
problem as two different types of resource allocation problems. We prove the decentralized
sequential best response dynamic would converge to a pure Nash Equilibrium under the
framework of weighted congestion game theory. Lower bounds of suboptimality of pure
Nash equilibria with respect to the resource allocation problems are discussed. Numerical
simulations and experiments on Robotarium are conducted to show the effectiveness of the
above algorithms. We also show that strong Nash equilibrium is not equal to pure Nash
equilibriumm in the settings of ST-MR task allocation problems and the potential of strong
Nash equilibrium to improve suboptimality lower bound.
4.1 Preliminaries
Definition 8. A weighted congestion game model is a tuple (N, T,E, Ñ , (Σi)i∈N , (wi)i∈N ,
W, (lj)j∈T , (Pi)i∈N), where (1) N = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of n robots; (2) T =
{1, 2, ..., t} denotes the set of t different tasks; (3) E = {1, 2, ..., e} denotes the set of
e different species of robots; (4) Ñ = {ñ1, ..., ñe}, where ñ1, ..., ñe are the number of
robots for species 1, ..., e; (5) Σi ⊆ T is the strategy space for robot i, which contains
all tasks robot i could choose; (6) wi = {wi1, ..., wit} is the weight profile for robot i,



























Figure 4.1: an example of weight profiles for 4 species of robots and 4 different tasks
weight profile). Robots belong to the same species have the same weight profile; (7)W =
{W1, ...,Wt}, where W1, ...,Wt are the total weights of robots (sum of weights of robots
doing this specific task) assigned to task 1, ..., t; (8) lj is the latency function for task j,
and the latency of a task measures the congestion of that task, which depends on how much
weights are assigned to that task; (9) Pi is the payoff function for robot i.
Denote S = Σ1 × Σ2... × ΣN . A strategy profile of the standard congestion game is
a vector s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S, where robot i ∈ N chooses a task si ∈ Σi. The latency
function lj(s) for task j is a function mapping from S to R. Given a strategy profile s, Wj
is the total weights of robots assigned to task j. The latency function lj(s) for task j only
depends on Wj such that lj(s) = lj(Wj).
Given a strategy profile s, Robot i’s payoff function Pi(s) is equal to task si’s latency
function such that Pi(s) = lsi(s) = lsi(Wsi), where si is the task robot i is assigned to in
strategy profile s. Let J(s) =
∑
i∈N












We consider payoff maximization games, in which robots strive to maximize their own
payoff.
Definition 9. A weighted potential function is a function Φ mapping from S to R, such that
for ∀i ∈ N and ∀s = (s1, ..., si, ..., sn), s
′
= (s1, ..., s
′
i, si+1, ..., sn) ∈ S,
Φ(s)− Φ(s′) = k(Pi(s)− Pi(s
′
)).
where k ∈ R>0 is a constant. Put it in another way, if a robot unilaterally changes its task,
the change of the exact potential function is equal to the change of the robot’s payoff.
Definition 10. A congestion game is a weighted potential game if there exists a weighted
potential function.
4.2 Two Resource Allocation Problems for Task Allocation for Heterogeneous Robot
Teams
As discussed in section 3.2, we formulate the task allocation problem as two types of re-
source allocation problems. The first resource allocation problem assumes the better per-
formance of the task with more participating robots. However, the corresponding marginal
gain with respect to the number of participating robots is monotonically decreasing. The
second resource allocation problem assumes the better performance of the task with more
participating robots, and the corresponding marginal gain regarding the number of partici-
pating robots is monotonically increasing.
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4.2.1 Marginal Gain Increasing With Respect to the Number of Participating Robots









s.t. nj ≤ cj, j = {1, 2, ..., t}
(4.1)
whereW1, ...,Wt is the total weights of robots (sum of weights of robots doing this specific




aj ∈ [0, 1] is the associated weight (priority) of task j, cj is the constraint on the maximum




This optimization problem is known as multiple quadratic knapsack problem, which is
NP-hard [38].
Given a strategy profile s, the corresponding robot level payoff function for robot i is:
Pi(s) = lsi(s) = lsi(Wsi) =

asiwisiWsi if nsi ≤ csi
0 if nsi > csi
(4.2)
where si is the task robot i chooses in the strategy profile s, lsi is the latency function of
task si, wisi is robot i’s weight for task si, Wsi is the total weights of robots doing task si,
nsi is the number of robots participating in task si. The robot level payoff function Pi(s) is
monotonically increasing with respect to the total weights of co-working robots when the
number of co-working robots is no more than csi . If the number of co-working robots is
greater than csi , robot i’s payoff becomes zero. This ensures the numbers of participating
robots for all tasks satisfy the constraints in any resultant pure Nash equilibria. By summing
over all robots’ payoff functions, optimizing the sum of robots’ payoff become equivalent
















4.2.2 Marginal Gain Decreasing With Respect to the Number of Participating Robots









whereW1, ...,Wt is the total weights of robots (sum of weights of robots doing this specific




and aj ∈ [0, 1] is the associated weight (priority) of task j.
The ideal objective function is
∑t
j=1 aj log(1 +Wj). However, there are no theoretical
guarantees of convergences to pure Nash equilibriums for this objective function. Although
jiggling at some points, the objective function in (4.3) could be viewed as an approximation
to the ideal objective function, which has theoretical guarantees of convergences to pure
Nash equilibriums (see figure 4.2).
Given a strategy profile s, the corresponding robot level payoff function for robot i is:




if Wsi > 0
0 if Wsi = 0
(4.4)
where si is the task robot i chooses in the strategy profile s, lsi is the latency function of task
k and Wsi is the total weights of robots doing task si. The robot level payoff function Pi(s)
is monotonically decreasing with respect to the total weights of co-working robots. By
summing over all robots’ payoff functions, optimizing the sum of robots’ payoff become
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Figure 4.2: an example of the social payoff of a task in (4.3), i.e, the sum of all participating
robots’ payoff
equivalent to optimizing the above resource allocation problem. To be more specific, we














4.3 Decentralized sequential best response dynamics
4.3.1 Algorithm Description
Readers are referred to section 3.3.1 for pseudo code and algorithm description.
4.3.2 Convergence to a Pure Nash Equilibrium
Definition 11. Sorted lexicographical order: Let a = (a1, ..., aq), b = (b1, ..., bq) be two
vectors ∈ Rq+. Let â = (â1, ..., âq) and b̂ = (b̂1, ..., b̂q) ∈ R
q
+ be two lexicographically
sorted vectors generated from a, b by permuting the entries in a non-decreasing way such
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that â1 ≥ â2 ≥ ... ≥ âq and b̂1 ≥ b̂2 ≥ ... ≥ b̂q. a is sorted lexicographically smaller than
b if there exists an index m such that âi = b̂i for all i < m and âm < b̂m [47].
Theorem 5. Decentralized sequential best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium for the two resource allocation problems formulated in section 4.2.
Proof. (a) Marginal gain increasing with respect to the number of participating robots
For this type of resource allocation problem, we show best response dynamics converge
to a pure Nash equilibrium by constructing a weighted potential function.












where Wj is the sum of weights of task j’s participating robots in strategy profile s, k is
the task robot i is participating in strategy profile s, wik is robot i’s weight for task k and
aj, ak are the associated weights (priority) for task j and k.
To show Φ(s) is a weighted potential function, consider a robot i moves from task p
to task q. The strategy profile before robot i’s move is s = (s1, ..., si = p, ..., sn) and the
strategy profile after robot i’s move is s′ = (s1, ..., si = q, ..., sn). We have:
Φ(s)− Φ(s′) = apW 2p − ap(Wp − wip)2 + aqW 2q − aq(Wq + wiq)2 + apw2ip − aqw2iq
= 2(apwipWp − aqwiq(Wq + wiq))
(4.6)
where (apwipWp − aqwiq(Wq +wiq) is equal to Pi(s)− Pi(s
′
). Hence, Φ(s) is a weighted
potential function.
Note that Φ(s) is a potential function for strategy profiles that satisfy the constraints
(i.e., constraints on the maximum number of participating robots for each task) discussed
in section 4.2.1. Although the strategy profile generated after the initialization phase may
not satisfy the constraints, robots’ special tailored payoff functions (see equation (4.2))
would lead to strategy profiles that satisfy the constraints. Hence, we can safely ignore
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the possibility that strategy profiles generated after the initialization phase may not satisfy
the constraints, and sequential best response dynamics would converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium.
(b) Marginal gain decreasing with respect to the number of participating robots
For this type of resource allocation problem, we show that sequential best response
dynamics would converge to a pure Nash equilibrium by showing it is monotonically de-
creasing in the sorted lexicographical order.
Given a strategy profile s = (s1, ..., si = p, ..., sn), vector L(s) = (W1, ...,Wt), where
W1, ...,Wt are the sum of weights of task 1, ..., t’s participating robots in strategy profile
s. Suppose a robot i moves from task p to task q under sequential best response dynamics.
The strategy profile after robot i’s move is s′ = (s1, ..., si = q, ..., sn) while L(s
′
) =
(W1, ...,Wp−wip, ...,Wq+wiq, ...,Wt). Let ˆL(s) and ˆL(s′) be the lexicographically sorted
vectors generated form L(s) and L(s′). Since robot i moves from task p to task q under
best response dynamics, log(1+Wp)
Wp
is less than log(1+Wq+wiq)
Wq+wiq
. Hence, Wp > Wq + wiq. Also
Wp is bigger than Wp − wip. As a result, ˆL(s′) is sorted lexicographically smaller than
ˆL(s). Therefore, strategy profiles generated under sequential best response dynamics are
monotonically decreasing in the sorted lexicographic order. In conclusion, sequential best
response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.
4.3.3 Time Complexity Analysis
We refer to the unit of time required for each robot to execute an iteration of the sequen-
tial best response dynamics (lines 10-24) as a time step. Recall in definition 8, Ñ =
{ñ1, ..., ñe}, where ñ1, ..., ñe are the number of robots for species 1, ..., e. Also W =
{W1, ...,Wt}, where W1, ...,Wt are the total weights of robots (sum of weights of robots








configurations of W . For the case of marginal gain decreasing with respect to the number
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of participating robots, the maximum number of time steps required for converging to a







. For the case of marginal gain increasing with re-







time steps to reach a








ations to reach a pure Nash equilibrium. In a single time step, a robot needs to investigate
t tasks in an iteration (line 11). The complexity for constructing the set K? and finding k??









Recall the definition of suboptimality in definition 7. In this section, we investigate the
lower bound of suboptimality.
4.4.1 Marginal Gain Decreasing
We utilize the λ− µ smoothness technique developed in [10] to investigate lower bound of
suboptimality.
Assumption 5. For a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile s, Wj ≥ 1,∀j ∈ T . In other
words, each task’s total weight is no less than one.
Assumption 6. For the optimal strategy strategy profile s?, W ?j ≥ 1,∀j ∈ T , where W ?j
is the sum of weights of task j’s participating robots in strategy profile s?. In other words,
each task’s total weight is no less than one.
These two assumptions are useful for the further derivation.
Given a strategy profile s which is a pure Nash equilibrium and a strategy profile s?
which maximizes the sum of all robots’ payoff. By the definition of pure Nash equilibrium,





where s = (s1, ..., si, ..., sn), s
′
= (s1, ..., s
?
i , ..., sn) and s
?
i is the task robot i chooses in
the optimal strategy profile s?.



























Pi(s), Wj is the sum of weights of task j’s participating robots in strategy
profile s, n?j is the number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s
?, and W̃j is the
integer generated by applying the ceiling operator to Wj . The first inequality holds true
due to (4.7). The second and third inequality holds true as lj , ∀j ∈ T , is a monotonically
decreasing function for this specific resource allocation problem.
Suppose there exists λ > 0 and µ > 0 such that for arbitrary task j:
lj(W̃j + 1)n
?
j ≥ λlj(W ?j
:::
)n?j − µlj(W̃j)nj, nj = {1, . . . , n}, n?j = {1, . . . , n},
W̃j = {1, ..., nj}, W ?j
:::
= {1, ...,max{1, n?j − 1}}
(4.9)
where nj is the number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s, W ?j is the sum of
weights of task j’s participating robots in strategy profile s?,W ?j
:::
is the integer generated
by applying the floor operator to W ?j . Wj and W
?
j are both ranging from 1 to n instead of










































?), Wj is the sum of weights of task j’s partici-
pating robots in strategy profile s, W ?j is the sum of weights of task j’s participating robots
in strategy profile s?, n?j is the number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s
?, nj is the
number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s, W̃j is the integer generated by applying
the ceiling operator to Wj and W ?j
:::
is the integer generated by applying the floor operator to
W ?j . The first inequality holds true due to inequality (4.8). Then second inequality is true
as a result of inequality (4.9). The third inequality holds true as lj , ∀j ∈ T , is a monotoni-
cally decreasing function for this specific resource allocation problem. The forth inequality
holds ture as µ > 0.







In summary, for this specific resource allocation problem, one way to find the lower













q, p = {1, ..., n},
q = {1, . . . , n},Wp = {1, ..., p},Wq = {1, ...,max{1, q − 1}}.































Figure 4.3: Suboptimality lower bounds obtained for n=16,17,18,19,20 robots
Example 2. Figure 4.3 shows suboptimality lower bounds for n=16,17,18,19 and 20 robots
by solving the nonlinear optmization problem.
4.4.2 Marginal Gain Increasing
Assumption 7. For a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile s, Wj ≥ 1,∀j ∈ T . In other
words, each task’s total weight is no less than one.
Assumption 8. For the optimal strategy strategy profile s?, W ?j ≥ 1,∀j ∈ T . In other
words, each task’s total weight is no less than one.
These two assumptions are useful for further derivation.
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Suppose strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium, and s? is a strategy profile that
maximizes the sum of all robots’ payoff. By the definition of pure Nash equilibrium, we




where s = (s1, ..., si, ..., sn), s
′
= (s1, ..., s
?
i , ..., sn) and s
?
i is the task robot i chooses
in the optimal strategy profile s?. For now, we assume after robot i moves from si to
s?i , the resultant strategy profile still satisfies the constraint (e.g, the number of a task’s
participating robots does not exceed the constraint on the maximum number of participating
robots).



























Pi(s), Wj is the sum of weights of task j’s participating robots in




the integer generated by applying the floor operator to Wj . The first inequality holds due
to (4.12). The second and third inequality hold as a result of the fact that for ∀j ∈ T , lj is
a monotonically increasing function for this specific resource allocation problem.
Suppose there exists λ > 0 and µ > 0 such that for arbitrary task j:
lj(Wj
:::
)n?j ≥ λlj(W̃ ?j )n?j − µlj(Wj
:::
)nj, nj = {1, . . . , cj − 1},
n?j = {1, . . . , cj}, Wj
:::
= {1, ...,max{nj − 1, 1}}, W̃ ?j = {1, ..., n?j}
(4.14)
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where cj is the constraint on the maximum participating robot for task j, nj is the number of
robots doing task j in strategy profile s, W ?j is the sum of weights of task j’s participating
robots in strategy profile s?,W̃ ?j is the integer generated by applying the ceiling operator to
W ?j , and max{nj − 1, 1} represents the larger number of nj − 1 and 1. Wj and W ?j are









































?), Wj is the sum of weights of task j’s partici-
pating robots in strategy profile s, W ?j is the sum of weights of task j’s participating robots
in strategy profile s?, n?j is the number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s
?, nj is the
number of robots doing task j in strategy profile s, Wj
:::
is the integer generated by applying
the floor operator to Wj and W̃ ?j is the integer generated by applying the ceiling operator
to W ?j . The first inequality holds due to (4.13). The second inequality is true due to (4.14).
The third inequality holds as a result of the fact that for ∀j ∈ T , lj is a monotonically in-
creasing function for this specific resource allocation problem. The forth inequality holds
as µ > 0.








In the derivation of inequality (4.12), we assume after robot i move from si to s?i , the
resultant strategy profile still satisfies the constraint. However, it is possible to the resultant
strategy profile does not satisfies the constraints. To handle this case, we let λ and µ satisfy
additional constraints for arbitrary task j ∈ T :
lj(Wj
:::
) ≥ λlj(W̃ ?j )n?j − µlj(Wj
:::
)nj nj = {1, . . . , cj},
n?j = {1, . . . , cj}, Wj
:::
= {1, ...,max{nj − 1, 1}}, W̃ ?j = {1, ..., n?j}
(4.17)
Suppose there is a set N ′ of robots switching to task j in the strategy profile s′ , but the











where si is the task robot i chooses in the strategy profile s. The inequality holds due to
(4.17). We can plug (4.18) into (4.15) such that the suboptimality lower bound still holds
true.
In summary, for this specific resource allocation problem, one way to find the lower






s.t. λWqq − µWpp≤ Wpq,
p = {1, . . . , (ck)max − 1}, q = {1, . . . , (ck)max},Wp = {1, ...,max{p








= {1, . . . , (ck)max}, q
′
= {1, . . . , (ck)max},Wp = {1, ...,max{p
′ − 1, 1}},Wq = {1, ..., q}
where (ck)max is the maximum of ck,∀k ∈ T and cj is the constraint on the maximum
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number of participating robots of task j.
Example 3. Suppose we have 5 tasks, and 18 robots belong to four different species. Each
task requires at most four robots to participate. The suboptimality lower bound obtained
via solving the nonlinear optimization problem is 0.0625.
4.5 Strong Nash Equilibrium
In this section, We show that the set of strong Nash equilibria is not equivalent to the
set of pure Nash equilibria for weighted congestion games in the context of ST-MR task
allocation problem. By contrast, theorem 4 states that the set of strong Nash equilibria is
equivalent to the set of pure Nash equilibria for standard congestion games in the context
of ST-MR task allocation problem. We further discuss strong Nash equilibrium’s potential
to improve suboptimality lower bounds.
Theorem 6. In the context of ST-MR task allocation problem, strong Nash equilibrium ex-
ists for weighted congestion games with monotonically decreasing latency functions [47].
Strong Nash equilibria are pure Nash equilibria, but pure Nash equilibria are not neces-
sarily strong Nash equilibrium. Next, we give an example to show a pure Nash equilibrium
is not a strong Nash equilibrium for weighted congestion games in the context of ST-MR
task allocation problem.
Table 4.1: weight profile for example 4
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
species 1 0.68 0.5539 0.6440 0.6328
species 2 0.13 0.8908 0.4075 0.7593
species 3 0.0702 0.5858 0.2614 0.2339
species 4 0.0454 0.5315 0.6092 0.2887
Example 4. Suppose we have four tasks, four species of robots and each species has ten
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Table 4.2: Example’s task allocation result
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
species 1 4 1 3 2
species 2 5 2 2 1
species 3 1 1 3 5
species 4 7 1 0 2
robots. Table 4.1 shows the weight profiles for each species of robots. Table 4.2 shows the






Figure 4.4: Strong Nash equilibrium is a subset of pure Nash equilibrium for weighted
congestion games in the context of ST-MR task allocation problems
The motivation of investigating strong Nash equilibrium is straightforward. As shown
in figure 4.4, strong Nash equilibrium is a subset of pure Nash equilbirum. Hence, strong
Nash equilibria might be able to provide approximate solutions for resource allocation
problems with higher suboptimality lower bounds compared to pure Nash equilibrium.
4.6 simulations
4.6.1 Scalability
We conduct numerical simulations to investigate sequential best response dynamics’s scal-
ability regarding the number of tasks, robots and species. We define an iteration as an loop
of the main loop of the algorithms (lines 10-24 for sequential best response dynamics). For
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Figure 4.5: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with decreas-
ing marginal gain. Number of iterations of convergence for varying numbers of robots






















Figure 4.6: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with decreas-
ing marginal gain. Number of iterations of convergence for varying numbers of tasks
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Figure 4.7: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with decreas-
ing marginal gain. Number of iterations of convergence for varying numbers of species of
robots
each test case, we run 100 Monte Carlo trials. The statistical results of iterations required
for convergences are shown in figures 4.5-4.10 as box plots. The mean values of iterations
are indicated by a green circle and connected via green lines.
Figures 4.5-4.7 show convergence performances for sequential best response dynamics
applying to resource allocation problem with decreasing marginal gain. Figure 4.5 presents
the statistical results for varying numbers of robots. We fix the number of tasks and species
to 5. The number of iterations for convergence is approximately a linear function of the
number of robots. Figure 4.6 shows the statistical results for varying numbers of tasks. We
fix the number of robots to 100 and species to 5. The number of iterations for convergence
peaks at t=15 and then goes down at t=20. This is possibly due to the combinatorial time
complexity in section 4.3.3. Figure 4.7 presents the statistical results for varying numbers
of species. We fix the number of robots to 120 and the number of tasks to 5. Each species
of robots have the same number of robots. The number of iterations for convergence is
approximately a linear function of the number of robots.
Figures 4.8-4.10 show convergence performances for sequential best response dynam-
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Figure 4.8: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with increas-
ing marginal gain. Number of iterations of convergence for varying numbers of robots




























Figure 4.9: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with increas-
ing marginal gain. Number of iterations of convergence for varying numbers of tasks
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Figure 4.10: Convergence performance for sequential best response dynamics with increas-
ing marginal gain. Number of iterations of convergence for varying numbers of species of
robots
ics applying to resource allocation problem with increasing marginal gain. Figure 4.8
presents the statistical results for varying numbers of robots. We fix the number of tasks
and species to 5. The number of iterations for convergence is approximately a linear func-
tion of the number of robots. Figure 4.9 shows the statistical results for varying numbers
of tasks. We fix the number of robots to 100 and species to 5. The number of iterations
bottoms at t=5 while remaining constant for t=5,15,20. Figure 4.7 presents the statistical
results for varying numbers of species. We fix the number of robots to 100 and the number
of tasks to 5. The number of iterations for convergence is approximately a linear function of
the number of robots. This is possibly due to the combinatorial time complexity in section
4.3.3.
4.6.2 Suboptimality
We conduct 1000 Monte Carlo trials to investigate suboptimality performances for both
types of resource allocation problems. Tests results are presented in figures 4.11 and 4.12
as histograms.
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Figure 4.11: Suboptmality performances for resource allocation problems with decreasing
marginal gains
Figure 4.12: Suboptmality performances for resource allocation problems with increasing
marginal gains
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For resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal gains, we consider a sce-
nario of 20 robots belong to four species and four different tasks. Each species has five
robots. As shown in figure 4.11, the frequency distribution is peaked for suboptimality
ranging from 06.-0.7. The minimum suboptimality obtained in the experiment is 0.49.
For resource allocation problems with increasing marginal gains, we consider a scenario
of 18 robots belong to three species and four different tasks. Each species has six robots.
As shown in figure 4.12, the frequency distribution is peaked for suboptimality ranging
from 08.-0.9. The minimum suboptimality obtained in the experiment is 0.59, while the
suboptimality lower bound obtained by following the approach in section 4.4.1 is 0.0625.
4.7 Experiments on Robotarium
In this section, we implement decentralized sequential best response dynamics for both
types of resource allocation problems on Robotarium.
For resource allocation problems with decreasing marginal gains, we consider a sce-
nario with seven robots belong to 4 species and four tasks. We divide the Robotarium into
4 subareas. Each subarea represents a task. If a robot is staying in a subarea, it is partici-
pating in the task which this specific subarea represents. Species 1,2, and 3 each have two
robots. Species 4 has a single robot. Weights (priorities) for each task are 0.8, 0.7, 0.75,0.9.
Weight profiles for each species of robots are shown in table 4.3. Task allocation results
are shown in table 4.4 and figure 4.13.
Table 4.3: weight profiles for decreasing marginal gain
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
species 1 0.3962 0.2417 0.9412 0.2348
species 2 0.1112 0.4039 0.9561 0.3532
species 3 0.7803 0.0965 0.5752 0.8212
species 4 0.3897 0.1320 0.0598 0.0154
For resource allocation problems with increasing marginal gains, we consider a scenario
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Table 4.4: task allocation result for decreasing marginal gain
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
species 1 1 0 0 1
species 2 1 0 0 1
species 3 0 2 0 0
species 4 0 0 1 0
Figure 4.13: task allocation result for decreasing marginal gain
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with seven robots belong to 4 species and four tasks. Species 1,2, and 3 each have two
robots. Species 4 has a single robot. Weights (priorities) for each task are 0.8, 0.7, 0.75,0.9.
The maximum numbers of participating robots for each task are 2,3,2,3. Weight profiles
for each species of robots are shown in table 4.5. Task allocation results are shown in table
4.6 and figure 4.14.
Table 4.5: weight profiles for increasing marginal gain
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
species 1 0.3909 0.9976 0.1375 0.7316
species 2 0.0546 0.8116 0.3900 0.6183
species 3 0.5013 0.4857 0.9274 0.3433
species 4 0.4317 0.8944 0.9175 0.9360
Table 4.6: task allocation result for increasing marginal gain
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
species 1 1 1 0 0
species 2 0 1 0 1
species 3 0 0 2 0
species 4 0 1 0 0
Figure 4.14: task allocation result for increasing marginal gain
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we aim to develop decentralized task allocation algorithms to provide ap-
proximate solutions to resource allocation problems. We consider two types of resource
allocation problems, with monotonically increasing marginal gains or with monotonically
decreasing marginal gains. Thanks to the hierarchical structure of congestion games, we
can decompose the global level objective functions to robot level payoff functions. For
homogeneous robot teams, we unify the decentralized best response dynamics under the
framework of standard congestion game theory. We also propose decentralized concur-
rent best response dynamics and decentralized dual greedy algorithm. For heterogeneous
robot teams, we show decentralized best response dynamics would converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous robot teams, we discuss the subop-
timality of pure Nash equilibria via λ−µ smoothness technique. Simulations are conducted
to investigate scalability and suboptimality. The above algorithms are implemented on the
Robotraium.
5.2 Future Work
We point out three interesting directions for future work.
Suboptimality lower bound In the experiments, we observe that suboptimality lower
bounds obtained by λ − µ smoothness argument is conservative. We observe much bet-
ter performances in experiments compared to the obtained suboptimality lower bounds.
Hence, it would be useful to obtain tighter suboptimality lower bounds.
Strong Nash equilibrium In section 4.5, we discuss strong Nash equilibrium’s poten-
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tial to improve suboptimality lower bounds. It would be interesting to generalize the dual
greed algorithm to weighted congestion games or develop other algorithms to converge to
strong Nash equilibrium.
Interference games It is possible that different species of robots could cooperate in
complementing each other to achieve better performances compared to working alone. To
capture this characteristic, we could consider adding an interference structure to conges-
tion games. To be more specific, the total weight for a task is not a simple sum of all
participating robot’s weights, but a function of the composition of robot teams.
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